Analysis, interpretation, and the local dimension of economic transformation: What went wrong and why? by Bruno Dallago
Analysis, interpretation, and the local dimension of 





seriesThis research was funded 
by   the   Autonomous 
Province of Trento, as the 
sponsor   of the  OPENLOC 
research project under the 
call   for   proposals   “Major 
Projects 2006”. Partners of 
the   project   are:   the   E. 
Mach   Foundation,   the 
Manchester   Institute   of 
Innovation   Research,   the 
Trento Museum of Natural 
Sciences, the University of 
Bologna   and   the 






THE TRANSFORMATION OF POST-SOVIET ECONOMIES TWENTY YEARS 
ON 
9-10 October 2009 
 




         Draft 
August 2009 
 
Analysis, interpretation, and the local dimension of economic 
transformation: What went wrong and why?
1 
by Bruno Dallago 




Transformation has been put in motion by a variety of both endogenous and exogenous forces. 
Although not any process was under the control of those countries, their choice of goals and 
instruments was anyway particularly great, at least theoretically. However, transformation was 
implemented  as  a  rather  narrowly  defined  and  technically  circumscribed  problem-solving 
process aiming at applying sound general principles of economics and management to reach 
well-defined goals. It turned out to generate new problems and resulted in different outcomes 
in different countries and, within individual countries, in different territories.  
This paper treats transformation as innovation and considers that it had to deal with different 
dimensions, including both general principles and local features, opportunities, and constraints, 
and both analysis based on problem-solving, and interpretation of the new situation. These 
dimensions should have been managed simultaneously, but failed to do so. The paper provides 
a general explanation for the failure in managing simultaneously the various components of 
transformation  and  considers  what  the  2008  international  crisis  has  revealed  of  the 
implementation of 20 years of transformation. 
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“Productive societies, to sustain themselves, must be both efficient and creative. The 
two attributes do not coexist comfortably. The balance between them must in fact be 
continuously reassessed and recreated, especially in periods of rapid economic change.” 
(Lester and Piore 2004, p. 194) 
 
Transformation has been put in motion by both endogenous and exogenous forces. 
The former had to do with achievements and failures of the Soviet-type system and 
the  national  variants  that  existed,  the  latter  with  international  processes  such  as 
globalisation  and  the  economic,  military  and  political  pressure,  threats  and 
opportunities that richer Western countries, their governments, agencies, enterprises, 
and citizens exerted upon Central and Eastern European countries. Although not any 
process was under the control of those countries, their choice of goals and instruments 
was great, at least theoretically. 
However,  transformation  was  implemented  as  a  narrowly  defined  and  technically 
circumscribed  problem-solving  process  aiming  primarily,  if  not  exclusively  to  apply 
sound general principles of economics and management to reach well-defined goals. 
Indeed,  its  most  popular  definition  is  that  of  “transition”,  that  implies knowing  the 
starting point, having clear the goal and a precise idea of the path leading from the 
former to the latter. The path was largely determined, or anyway strongly influenced 
by  what  was  defined  as  the  “Holy  Trinity”  of  the  Washington  Consensus: 
macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisations, and liberalisation. 
By implementing transformation as a problem-solving, transition turned out to cause as 
many problems as it contributed to solve. Even more important, it resulted in different, 
sometimes extremely different outcomes in different countries and, within individual 
countries,  in  different  territories.  Although  achievements  have  been  important  in 
various cases, the sustainability of successes is far from being guaranteed. The 2008 
crisis may have revealed the structural weakness of the situations that came out of 
transformation. After two decades it is time to ask what happened: was transition the 
wrong approach, or did countries implement badly a correct recipe, or did they react in 
the wrong way to political and social pressures? Or was a technically sound strategy 
implemented  in  the  wrong  context?  Was  anything  important  disregarded  or  was  a 
different strategy required? 
The paper relies on some recent developments in political economy theory and treats 
transformation as innovation, as indeed it was. In the next section it presents briefly 
recent  developments  in  political  economy  theory  that  are  particularly  close 
methodologically to the issue of transformation. Section 2 deals with the legacies of 
the old system, that identify starting conditions, and considers choices that countries 
were confronted with in order to transform their economic systems. In section 3 it is 
considered  what  economic  performance  during  the  last  20  years  reveals  about  the 
soundness  of  the  chosen  strategy  and  development  path.  It  turns  out  that 
transformation had to deal with different dimensions, that should have been managed 
simultaneously,  but  failed  to  do  so.  This  is  the  topic  of  the  fourth  section.  One 
important, disregarded dimension that could have contributed to such simultaneous 
management was local development: section 5. highlights why this is so and what are 
the  consequences  of  its  disregard.  Section  6.  concludes  by  providing  a  general Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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explanation for the failure in managing simultaneously and at different (general and 
local) levels the various components of transformation. It also considers what the 2008 
international crisis has revealed about twenty years of transformation and depicts the 
challenges ahead. 
 
1.  Reform theory 
Transformation can be interpreted as multilevel radical innovation. Indeed it consists in 
a set of wide-reaching and deep processes of different nature and at different levels 
that changed dramatically and permanently the very nature, working and outcome of 
economic activity, along with many other fields. Among the most important innovative 
changes have been the institutional setting of former Soviet-type economies; property 
and other economic rights and relations (e.g. the right to hire and dismiss employees); 
social relations in the economy (particularly between capital and labour); the role and 
nature of policies (from administrative to market policies); economic calculation and 
decision-making  (from  centrally  planned  macroeconomic  to  decentralised 
microeconomic); motivations and incentives to economic activity (from implementing 
central  plans  to  competition  and  profit);  the  organisational  setting  of  the  economy 
(different types of enterprises and economic organs, representation of different and 
sometimes conflicting interests, such as entrepreneurial associations and labour trade 
unions); coordination mechanisms (from plan and central administration to markets); 
the role of foreign trade and geographical orientation of markets (from close or semi-
close economies to open economies, from East to West); change of the main actors of 
economic activity (from administration to capitalist enterprises, from large bureaucratic 
companies to different size enterprises); change of technology (from semi-autarchic 
technology  to  world  technology,  introduction  of  new  products  and  processes, 
reorganisation of research). After these processes were implemented, and in spite of 
important  path  dependence  and  changes  of  strategy,  the  economies,  their  main 
agents,  and  their  working  were  widely  and  deeply  restructured  and  sometimes 
thoroughly changed. 
Considering transformation a multilevel radical innovation implies that change takes 
place  at  different  levels  and  perspectives  and  that,  being  radical,  uncertainty  is 
pervasive.  Being  multilevel  means  that  the  process  of  transformation  is  under  the 
influence of factors of different levels: international, national, and local level; formal 
and informal institutions and processes; past achievements and future aims and goals; 
public and private, large and small actors; processes of competition and cooperation. 
As a consequence, transformation must be in respect of general economic principles of 
sound management of the economy, but this must be done embedding these principles 
into local features, capabilities, opportunities, and constraints to guarantee economic, 
political, and social sustainability and effectiveness of changes. 
Being radical means that uncertainty is pervasive, since feasible goals are not clear, in 
particular if we consider their economic, political, and social sustainability, and the path 
to  be  followed  is  blurred.  In  fact,  reference  models  and  relevant  knowledge  are 
missing, being the first time in history that a radical transformation of centrally planned 
economies into market economies is implemented in a short span of time. Being radical 
also means that changing the parts (individual institutions and actors) is not sufficient: 
also  the  coordination  of  the  constituent  parts  and  the  whole  (the  entire  economic 
system) must change.  All this is a daunting aim that requires precise analysis and 
problem-solving.  However,  due  to  the  novelty  and  the  far  reaching  nature  of  the Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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undertaking this is not sufficient. Transformation also necessitates a broad and socially 
converging  perspective  of  the  problems  at  stake,  far-reaching  and  imaginative 
discussion  of  feasible  and  sustainable  alternatives,  debate  and  interaction  among 
involved parties to collect ideas and streamline goals and action, anticipation of the 
interrelation  among  individual  changes  that  are  introduced,  coordination  of 
expectations. Therefore, it is not sufficient to analyse: it is also necessary to interpret 
what exists and is changing. Both analytic and interpretative abilities are required. 
The problems to be solved in order to understand and manage transformation can be 
represented in a two by two matrix (table 1). The matrix lines include the double level 
of reforms that have to be implemented: conjugate the respect of general economic 
principles of good management with the adaptation to local circumstances (features, 
capabilities, opportunities, and constraints). In column, we find the double request of 
innovation:  analysis  to  define  the  problems  and  clarify  possible  solutions,  and 
interpretation to figure out the potential nature and features of the new product or 
process and build a common language among those who contribute to innovation. The 
matrix  includes  some  examples  of  explanations,  policies,  or  situations  that  have 
focused primarily (although not exclusively) on one of the four possible locations in the 
matrix. 
Table 1. The two double dimensions of transformation analysis 
Innovation 
 
Analysis (problem solving)  Interpretation 
General  principles 
of  good  economic 
management 
Washington Consensus 











“National” and regional ways 






Recent political economy theory offers some interesting perspectives and instruments 
to analyse the complex nature of transformation and brings the above matrix to unity. 
Reform policy analysis studies the conditions for identifying the optimal reform and 
reform  procedures  to  promote  growth  (Rodrik  2007).  Since  reviving  growth  and 
converging to the level of income of West European countries was the most prominent 
among the economic goals of transformation, this perspective is central to our analysis. 
Reform policy has, nearly by definition, trust in the ability of governments to improve 
the society and economy they are responsible for. This consideration is realistic in the 
case of transformation, since the role of governments was dominant, at least in the 
first stage when the new institutions and structural change were implemented. This 
governments do by following general principles of good economic management, but Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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also keeping local circumstances in great evidence, since opportunities and constraints 
differ according to the specific environment in which policies are implemented.
2 
In  fact,  general  principles  of  good  economic  management  (first-order  economic 
principles  in  mainstream  parlance)  –  which  include  protection  of  property  rights, 
contract  enforcement,  market-based  competition,  appropriate  incentives,  sound 
money, debt sustainability – are the outcome of institutions which can take on different 
forms in diverse environments to deliver those functions. Institutions do not map, then, 
into unique policy packages, thus leaving reformers substantial freedom.
3 
Since “[d]ifferent packages have different costs and benefits depending on prevailing 
political constraints, levels of administrative competence, and market failures” (Rodrik 
2007, p. 29), the skill of reformers will be to find the package of institutions that will 
minimise the costs and difficulties and maximise the benefits for a particular economy. 
This  is  under  the  constraint  of  path  dependence  (the  “pre-existing  institutional 
landscape”  in  Rodik’s  parlance)  and  other  local  circumstances.  Successful  reforms, 
then,  require  “considerable  local  knowledge”  (Rodrik  2007,  p.  42).  And  since  local 
circumstances vary, so do the reforms that work. 
This important conclusion stresses the necessity that reforms respect simultaneously 
the  general  principles  of  sound  economic  management  and  local  embeddedness  of 
policies. This amounts to say that rarely first-best solutions and policies are the most 
apt for reforming economies, since these are based exclusively on general principles. 
Effective and sustainable solutions and policies are typically second-best. 
Therefore,  reforms  require  deep  and  detailed  practical  knowledge  of  the  particular 
economy under reform. This opens an important space for analysis, but also requires 
far-reaching interpretation. In fact, reforming governments are constrained by limits on 
their  financial,  administrative,  human,  and  political  resources  and  capabilities.  To 
alleviate  these  constraints,  governments  must  be  able  to  identify  reform  priorities, 
based on local realities. 
Although blue-prints, best practices, international codes and standards, harmonisation 
can  provide  important  solutions  for  some  of  the  narrowly  ‘technical’  issues,  their 
importance  and  role  should  not  be  overemphasised  within  a  strategy  of  institution 
building  at  the  expense  of  experimentation.  What  is  fundamental  in  a  general 
institutional  reform  is  in  fact  “…a  process  of  discovery  about  local  needs  and 
capabilities.” (Rodrik 2007, p. 166) However, the necessity for a detailed and broad 
process of discovery should not be confused with the necessity for a gradual approach, 
although this latter method is in a sense familiar to the former.
4 Still the two are two 
distinct processes. 
                                                 
2 “…appropriate growth policies are almost always context specific. This is not because economics works 
differently in different settings, but because the environments in which households, firms, and investors 
operate  differ  in  terms  of  the  opportunities  and  constraints  they  present.  …  Learning  from  other 
countries is always useful – indeed, it is indispensable. But straightforward borrowing (or rejection) of 
policies without a full understanding of the context that enabled them to be successful (or led them to 
be failures) is a recipe for disaster.” (Rodrik 2007, pp. 4-5) 
3 “There is no unique correspondence between the functions that good institutions performs and the form 
that such institutions take. Reformers have substantial room for creatively packaging these principles 
into  institutional  designs  that  are  sensitive  to  local  constraints  and  take  advantage  of  local 
opportunities.” (Rodrik 2007, pp. 15-16) 
4 “… there is typically a large amount of uncertainty about what those institutional arrangements are , and 
therefore that the process required is more one of ‘search and discovery’ than one of gradualism. … Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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In evaluating reform policies, the focus cannot be on the outcome of reform policies – 
which is inherently unknowable ex ante – but on getting the reform process right. This 
can only result from a deep and broadly-based interpretive process that involves both 
technical expertise, but also genuinely social and political participation. The experience 
shows that “… participatory political systems are the most effective mechanism for 
processing and aggregating local knowledge.” (Rodrik 2007, p. 8 – see also chapter 5, 
pp. 153-183) 
The  relation  between  analysis  and  interpretation  at  microeconomic  level  and  in  a 
competitive  context  is  the  main  issue  of  a  second  important  line  of  thought  and 
research  deriving  from  the  analysis  of  what  actually  happens  in  large  firms  that 
implement successful innovation of radical type, such as in the case of the introduction 
of a new product, and the role that the ability to find new sustainable solutions plays.
5 
Innovation requires both analysis and interpretation (Lester and Piore 2007). Analysis 
is  essentially  a  rational  decision-making  approach  organised  around  projects,  that 
works best when alternative outcomes are well understood and can be clearly defined 
and distinguished from one another. Analysis requires that communication among the 
parties consists of the precise exchange of pieces of information. Interpretation can be 
best defined as a process ongoing in time making use of fluid, context-dependent, 
undetermined  communication.  Interpretation  is  not  directed  toward  the  solution  of 
well-defined  problems:  it  is  without  clear  end-points,  but  setting  directions  of 
innovation in order to make people with very different interests and perspectives come 
to share a common vision and understanding. These kinds of interpretative processes 
are  more  appropriate  when  the  possible  outcomes  are  unknown,  and  in  particular 
when  the  task  is  to  create  those  outcomes  and  determine  what  their  properties 
actually are. Indeed, interpretation uses ambiguity as a resource out of which new 
discoveries and insights emerge. 
Analysis  and interpretation are rooted in different perspectives over the economy and 
involve  very  different  and  in  general  opposite  kinds  of  skills  and  different  ways  of 
working together with other economic and social actors. It may be actually difficult for 
the  same  people  to  consider  both  of  them  simultaneously.  However,  the  ability  to 
manage these two approaches simultaneously and finding a balance between them is 
the key to sustaining the innovativeness and the competitiveness of economies. 
The simultaneous management of analysis and interpretation is important in all fields 
that require the management and use of innovation. For instance, the development of 
colour photography by the chemical industry and its use by photographers required the 
simultaneous  management  of  analysis  (developing  and  using  a  means  that  was 
technically  capable  of  registering  reality  with  sufficient  reliability,  improve  quality, 
analyse  the  reproducibility  of  individual  colours,  analyse  the  correspondence  of 
different greys to individual colours) and interpretation (produce films with specialised 
feature  -  more  faithful  or  bright  -  experiment  which  kinds  of  subjects  are  better 
photographed in colours than in black and white, how to go from a black and white 
vision and interpretation to a colour one, how to transmit visual messages by means of 
colours, discover new subjects that in black and white were inconspicuous such as the 
classical orange) (Dyker 2005, particularly pp. 186-188). 
                                                                                                                                               
what stands out in the cases of real success, …, is not gradualism per se but an unconventional mix of 
standard and nonstandard policies well attuned to the reality on the ground.” (Rodrik 2007, p. 35) 
5 “We tend to think of economic progress as being driven by the uniquely human capacity for rational 
analysis. But an equally important component of economic progress is creativity, and creativity is a 
social process.” (Lester and Piore 2007, p. 193) Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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When the interpretive process is missing, the range among which choices are done is 
too narrow. In these cases, strong analytical processes may lead to choose the best 
alternative within that range, but this is the right alternative of a bad lot. In fact, and 
although the analytical dimension must take precedence over the interpretive one in 
order to clarify the issues that can be clarified analytically, it is the interpretive process 
that determines the range of possible alternatives. 
This way of putting the problem has some correspondence in Amartya Sen’s (1999) 
analysis  of  development.  Development  is  in  fact  the  fundamental  dimension  of 
transformation,  even  if  analysts  and  policy  makers  interprete  it  too  often,  if  not 
exclusively, as growth of production. According to Sen, “[d]evelopment can be seen, 
…, as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.” (p. 3). Freedoms 
depend  certainly  upon  GDP,  but  many  other  factors  are  equally  important.  These 
include social and economic arrangements, such as facilities for education and health 
care; political and civil rights; and the removal of major sources of unfreedom, such as 
poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, systematic social deprivation. 
According to Sen, freedom is essential to development for two distinct reasons: the 
evaluative and the effectiveness reasons. The former has to do with the assessment of 
progress, that has to be done primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people 
have  are  enhanced.  The  latter  reason  sees  the  achievement  of  development  as 
thoroughly dependent upon the free agency of people. This concept of the relation 
between freedom and development has much to do with the above distinction between 
analysis  and  interpretation.  Although  Sen’s  distinction  is  not  the  same  as  between 
analysis  and  interpretation,  much  of  this  distinction  is  involved  in  the  concept  of 
development as freedom. 
Effectiveness  reasons  are  akin  to  problem  solving,  hence  analysis:  these  in  fact 
highlight  the  relevant  empirical  connections,  in  particular  the  mutually  reinforcing 
connections between freedoms of different kinds that are admittedly a major analytic 
issue. It seems obvious, though, that these mutually reinforcing connections have also 
much to do with interpretation, i.e. finding a common language and understanding 
among the members of society. In fact, empirical connections depend also upon social 
interaction, that in turn depends upon interpretation. 
As to evaluative reasons, seeing development as a process of expanding real freedoms 
for  everybody  is  clearly  the  fundamental  interpretative  dimension  and  its  very 
foundation. However, at the same time one should consider that “…these freedoms 
and rights are also very effective in contributing to economic progress” (Sen 1999, p. 
5), which adds an analytical perspective of assessing how this is so and how to go 
from freedoms to progress. 
There  are  two  sets  of  problems  with  interpretation  and  the  need  to  manage  it 
simultaneously with analysis. One has to do with the inherent fragility of interpretation. 
Indeed,  it  requires  cooperation,  transparency,  disclosure,  and  a  great  deal  of  trust 
among the parties. This may be at odds with a competitive environment, that gives 
wide  room  to  opportunism  and  secrecy.  This  problem,  however,  can  be  solved  by 
building  public  spaces  for  interpretation.  There  are  “…four  critical  types  of  public 
space” (Lester and Piore 2007, p. 122): the interior of the firm itself, industrial districts, 
the regulatory process, and the university. In the case of transformation countries, 
these public spaces should be complemented with political organisations, the media 
and civic organisations, and international agencies that have supported the process of 
transformation.  However,  what  actually  happened  in  transformation  countries  was Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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strikingly  similar  to  what  Lester  and  Piore  observe  in  the  case  of  enterprises,  i.e. 
competition dramatically decreased the scope for and role of interpretation and created 
a  need  for  public  spaces.
6  However,  in  transformation  countries  alternatives  were 
missing,  since  those  spaces  could  only  (mostly)  be  external  to  enterprises.  Their 
destructuring through transition  policies left no room for interpretation. 
Convinced that what mattered was to streamline as fast as possible Eastern European 
economies  to  the  successful  Western  economies  –  after  a  short  period  of  harsh 
adjustment  to  take  the  “fundamentals”  to  acceptable  values  -  governments  and 
international agencies made away with anything which resembled interpretation and 
went straight and exclusively to analysis and problem solving. The radical novelty of 
the process did not discourage this brave approach and was not even perceived as 
such.  One  important  reason  for  this  was  ignorance  of  the  issue.  In  fact,  a  new 
generation of economists and specialised agencies took over the duty who never dealt 
with  Soviet-type  economies  and  did  not  consider  the  stickiness  of  institutions, 
particularly informal one, and the consequences that this could have in delaying and 
diverting  problem  solving.  Big  ready-made  plans  resulting  from  purely  analytical 
processes based almost exclusively on general principles replaced interpretation and 
due concern for local features. 
When the damage of this approach became evident and social and economic tensions 
grew substantially and economic performance was less than acceptable, transformation 
countries and also international agencies moved to a more interpretive phase, trying to 
find  solutions  more  apt  to  the  local  features,  capabilities,  opportunities  and 
constraints.
7 However, at that time these economies were changed in an irreversible 
way and the room for interpretative reasoning and interaction was greatly constrained 
(e.g.  by  unbalanced  macroeconomic  situation,  falling  performance,  foreign  debt, 
international agreements). 
The second problem descends from the potential dangers of interpretive reasoning and 
interaction in an institutionally de-structured situation.
8 It is hard to imagine a fully 
cooperative  and  transparent  interaction  when  institutions  do  not  exist  that  keep 
ambiguity within manageable limits. Indeed, Lester and Piore have in mind a situation 
where fundamental ambiguity is reduced thanks to well working formal institutions and 
settled informal institutions. They refer to technological and market ambiguity, while 
transformation  consists  primarily  of  institutional  ambiguity.  As  a  consequence,  and 
since there is much value at stake that uncooperative and secretive actors can capture, 
interpretation can easily end up in a strategic game to defend privileges and capture 
                                                 
6 “The competition unleashed by globalization, technological change, and deregulation has reduced the 
scope for conversation and interpretation in private industry. This in turn has created a need to expand 
such spaces outside industry itself, in sectors of society where competitive pressures do not naturally 
reach.  The  trouble  is  that  exactly  the  opposite  lesson  has  been  drawn.  Convinced  that  it  was 
competitive  pressures  themselves  that  were  ultimately  responsible  for  the  boom  of  the  1990s, 
policymakers and business lobbyists have sought to reproduce in public spaces unconstrained by market 
precisely the kinds of competitive mechanisms that are imposed on private business by market forces.” 
(Lester and Piore 2007, p. 177) 
7 An important step in this process was the “World Bank’s “discovery” of the need for urgent reforms of 
the welfare state. See WB 1998. 
8 This case is different from the one that has been found in some Central European countries, particularly 
after their accession to the European Union and that took the form of populist economic policies based 
on  the  softening  of  the  budget  constraint.  On  Hungary  see  Lengyel  2008  and  Mihályi  2008.  When 
institutions are blurred and ineffective, foot dragging and opportunism serving powerful interest groups 
is a real danger that can easily derail interpretation and consequently effective reforms. Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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value. However, this is not an argument for limiting interaction to analysis, but instead 
to give priority to create the conditions for interpretation to play its irreplaceable role. 
This requires priority to institutional reform. However, as stressed above, this does not 
necessarily coincide with the superiority of gradualism against shock therapy. 
To be successful as a multilevel radical innovation, then, transformation requires the 
simultaneous management of analysis and interpretation and the consideration of both 
general principles and local features. Transition as it was implemented in Central and 
Eastern European countries appeared initially confined to the upper left square of our 
matrix, i.e. was one-sided. Predictably its outcome is unsatisfactory. 
 
2.  Legacies and choices 
As  any  general  process  of  innovation,  transformation  was  set  in  motion  by  both 
endogenous  and  exogenous  factors  and  the  interaction  among  them.   Endogenous 
factors  had  to  do  with  both  the  achievements  and  the  failures  of  the  Soviet-type 
system  and  the  national  variants  that  existed.  These  included,  among  others,  the 
success in implementing the industrialisation of backward countries with the inability to 
promote technical change and efficiency; the promotion of mass production with the 
inability to foster innovation and competitiveness; the eradication of unemployment 
with  the  inability  to  use  effectively  incentives  and  promote  productivity;  mass 
development of public services with their low effectiveness and financial sustainability. 
These  processes  ended  in  progressively  falling  growth  rates  after  remarkable 
performance in the Fifties, to near stagnation in the Eighties. 
Exogenous  factors  included  mainly  the  direct  and  indirect  consequences  of 
globalisation and the economic, military, social, and political pressure and opportunities 
that Western countries, their governments, agencies, enterprises, and citizens exerted 
upon  and  opened  to  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  and  their  citizens. 
Globalisation opened new opportunities, but also new challenges and constraints for 
countries.  International  trade  and  flows  of  capital  offered  new  opportunities  that 
Soviet-type economies were unable to capture also for the very inefficiencies of their 
economic system together with different forms  of open and hidden  embargo. With 
globalisation and swift growth of many economies the price of raw materials increased: 
raw material producers had to afford increasing opportunity costs to continue to export 
to other socialist countries at the fixed prices (or the delayed mobile averages adopted 
later on) envisaged by the Comecon agreements. The little integration of Soviet-type 
economies  in  the  globalisation  process  through  trade,  tourism  and  information  and 
communication revealed the disadvantage in level of consumption and life styles, thus 
activating a demonstration effect by citizens and consumers that the economy and 
polity were unable to satisfy. 
Pressure  by  Western  countries  had  both  military,  commercial,  and  financial 
components  and  both  put  heavy  burdens  upon  relatively  backward  and  inefficient 
economies and offered stimulating and favourable opportunities for economies hungry 
of both capital and imports. This led these countries to deplete their resources to keep 
pace  in  the  arms  race  and  unbalanced  chronically  their  balance  of  payments.  This 
happened particularly in the Eighties, but in some cases (in particular Poland, but also 
Romania and Hungary) also earlier, in the Seventies. 
The  interaction  among  endogenous  and  exogenous  factors  made  the  economic 
situation  of  those  countries  nearly  untenable  during  the  Eighties.  Economic  factors Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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interacted  with  political  and  social  factors  and  the  stick  and  carrot  that  Western 
countries  used  to  make  transformation  inevitable.  Or,  better,  alternatives  (such  as 
police and military repression) appeared unviable to the political leadership of those 
countries, although a minor part of those leaderships considered it and even tried to 
implement  it,  without  success  (e.g.  the  August  1991  coup  in  the  Soviet  Union). 
Alternatively, it was used as a minor evil, as in Poland in 1980, to control the society 
and pursue economic reform. 
In  the  economic  domain  the  main  goal  of  transformation  was  to  revive  the 
performance  of  the  economy.  According  to  the  standard  explanation  and  given 
resource endowment, the performance of an economy depends upon the environment, 
the  economic  system,  and  policies.  The  environment  was  changed  by  the  same 
political decision to open fully and become an integral part of the world economy. The 
economic system was changed by the decision to implement transformation: eliminate 
the Communist Party or at least its supreme role in the economy, close down the 
central planning office, start liberalisation and privatisation. Policies changed by both 
transforming  the  economic  system  (direct  administrative  intervention  became 
impossible, since the agencies in charge of implementing it either disappeared – like 
the Central Planning Office – or dramatically changed their nature – branch ministries, 
the  Central  Bank  and  the  state  budget  in  particular),  pursuing  macroeconomic 
stabilisation, and putting them under the guidance of international organisations. 
Which was the role of the four critical dimensions for sustainable reform in the events 
and achievements that led to transformation and its first steps? The Eighties in Central 
and Eastern Europe were an important period of systemic analysis and interpretation 
with great concern for local circumstances. Analysis and experience proved that the old 
system was not viable and tried to define the problems and clarify possible solutions 
for reforming the economic system. In this period critical analyses of the Soviet-type 
economic system and its reform flourished, with quite appreciable results. Many of 
these  analyses  criticised  the  system  for  disregarding,  by  its  very  nature,  the  most 
important  fundamentals  of  sound  economic  management  (including  hard  budget 
constraint, clarity and enforcement of property rights, effective markets). However, in 
particular after the Soviet Union, with the 1988 Gorbachev’s speech in Berlin, made 
clear it they did not intend to interfere in the other countries’ domestic affairs any 
more,  attempts  were  also  made  to  strengthen  further  the  local  content  of  the 
economic (and political) system. 
Due  to  the  blurred  institutional  and  political  situation,  most  of  the  effort  was  of 
interpretive nature and tried to figure out the potential nature and features of a new 
system more akin to the free choice of economic and political actors, and supposedly 
the  citizenry  and  consumers.  The  most  important  economic  moments  in  this 
interpretation were debates on how to improve the performance of the economy (with 
positions  ranging  from  plain  capitalism  to  market  socialism  via  self-management), 
experimentation with new quasi-private organisational forms (particularly in Hungary 
and  Poland),  setting  up  of  reform  committees  (e.g.  in  Hungary),  government-
opposition round tables in various countries, opposition circles with informal contact 
with government and Party circles in most countries. 
It is important to stress that this interpretation took place within the limits and the 
constraints of the (fading) reformed Soviet-type system. This was a period when basic 
institutions were in a flurry and could hardly constrain the parties, including individuals, 
to play a plain innovative interpretation. Indeed, under those conditions new valuable Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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positions could be captured that could be used later on to appropriate valuable assets. 
This situation jeopardised the very existence of public spaces for interpretation, leading 
so  to  speak  to  their  privatisation.  Interpretation  thus  became  primarily  a  strategic 
game whereby each active party tried to figure out and implement those features of 
the new system which could give them the greatest advantage. This is a situation in 
which  strategies  tend  to  diverge  to  the  damage  of  socially  desirable  and  shared 
outcomes. Power relations, strategic alliances and  foreign parties decide the outcome. 
In a sense, the strategy is primarily distributive in nature, while in standard innovative 
situations interpretation has a socially productive nature thanks to effective institutional 
constraints. 
 
3.  A digression on outcomes: do they prove the correctness of the chosen 
path? 
Although processes are what matters for the success of transformation, after twenty 
years there was abundant time for those processes to bear the fruits that they were 
suppose to deliver. Therefore the correctness of processes, in such time lapse, can also 
be  assessed  on  the  basis  of  outcomes.  Along  with  what  can  be  learned  from 
specialised  literature,  one  could  look  at  the  20  years  of  post  transformation 
performance of those economies to see whether performance validates the particular 
changes that were adopted. This is obviously a very indicative exercise, perhaps one 
methodologically risky in that it must suppose processes that cannot be verified. Yet it 
can give an idea of the strength of the choices and implementation since 1989. 
Following Janossy (1969) and considering transformation as a post-war reconstruction 
period, we may suppose that transformation is over when economic performance (the 
level  of  national  income)  reaches  the  level  that  it  would  have  reached  without 
transformation.  Although  controversial
9,  this  perspective  has  the  merit  to  put  the 
accent on the long-run variables that determine growth. Indeed, keeping its costs into 
consideration,  transformation  is  economically  and  socially  justified  only  if  long-term 
growth rates are superior to those brought by the old system. 
                                                 
9 Jánossy’s interpretation intends to demonstrate that any economy has the tendency to return to its long 
run trend after for whatever reason (e.g. a war) this trend was interrupted and that reconstruction 
periods are over when the economy reaches this trend again. This long-run growth rate is determined 
by  the  number  and  skill  of  the  labour  force  which  is  complementary  to  the  capital  stock  and  its 
technological composition, and that may not be fully exploited (e.g. because of the lack or destruction of 
capital).  Therefore  “economic  miracles”  are  simply  the  result  of  the  increasing  exploitation  of  this 
potential made possible by the progressive availability of the missing conditions (capital). In the case of 
transformation economies we can suppose that, similarly to post-war reconstruction periods, a large gap 
between actual and potential output opens up due to a discrepancy between the workplace structure of 
the economy and the qualification structure of the labour force. This ‘structural incongruence’ is likely to 
result from the depletion of physical capital, due to the nearly immediate obsolescence of much existing 
capital during the early stage of transformation. Accelerated investment, made possible also by large 
Western support, should progressively diminish such structural incongruence, allowing the economy to 
approach its long-run potential growth path. However, the openness to the more developed countries of 
the West should improve rapidly the skills of the labour force and accelerate technical progress, thus 
increasing  labour  productivity.  Critically  important,  systemic  change  should  give  these  countries  an 
economic system that guarantees better performance and more effective policies (although it should be 
noted that post-war years are usually distinct by some level of systemic change). This should result in 
higher long-run growth rates, i.e. in a new, superior long-run growth path. For an econometric test of 
Jánossy’s model explanatory power see Vonyó (2008). Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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If we take transformation countries as a whole, the outcome was overall disappointing 
compared to expectations and still insufficient to convince many constituencies in those 
countries  that  it  was  worth  doing  (Chart  1a).
10  (Un)satisfaction  is  obviously  a 
psychological perception that, although it has a real basis, is not necessarily objective. 
Moreover, it may change when looking at the future instead at the present or the past 
(Chart 1b). However, it is a fact that there were great expectations (illusions?) in 1989 
that  transformation  would  bring  clearly  improved  economic  performance  and 
consumption levels soon. Another aspect to consider is that poor performance may 
depend  upon  non-economic  reasons,  as  it  has  been  indeed  the  case  in  various 
countries. Therefore, the exercise that follows is simply indicative, a kind of suggestion 
of a research perspective that should be further explored. 
Chart 1a – The perception of changes of wealth of families since 
1989 
Source: EBRD-World Bank, Life in Transition Survey, 2006. 
 (http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/tr07p.pdf, 29 August 2009) 
Chart  1b  –  Different  perspectives  of 
(un)satisfaction  





Even leaving aside polarised social stratification (see below) and problems with data 
comparability  and  concentrating  on  aggregate  performance,  although  in  some 
countries  performance  has  been  apparently  quite  successful  particularly  since  mid-
Nineties, in other countries transformation resulted so far in substantial destruction 
with very little or no construction. We can easily see this by considering the growth of 
GDP after 1989 (Chart 2) and comparing it to the pre-1989 period (table 1). 
Table 1. GDP Growth Rates in Central and Eastern Europe 
  1950-60  1960-65  1965-70  1970-75  1975-80  1980-85  1985-90 
Bulgaria  6,7  6,7  5,1  4,6  0,9  1,2  0,4 
Czechoslovakia  4,8  2,3  3,4  3,4  2,2  1,5  1,2 
East Germany  5,7  2,7  3,0  3,4  2,3  1,8  1,6 
Hungary  4,6  4,2  3,0  3,4  2,0  1,7  0,7 
Poland  4,6  4,4  4,1  6,4  0,7  0,7  0,2 
Romania  5,8  6,0  4,9  6,7  3,9  1,0  0,6 
Soviet Union  5,7  5,0  5,2  3,7  2,7  2,0  1,8 
                                                 
10 A recent article by Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) concludes that transformation made indeed people 
unhappy and that this is associated with income, i.e. growth but also “depreciation of human capital 
stock accumulated under central planning, deteriorating public goods, and rising income inequality… Our 
results imply that life satisfaction in transition countries will continue to rise conditional on continued 
economic growth” (p. 166). 
Source: EBRD 2007 Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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Unweigh. average  5,4  4,5  4,1  4,5  2,1  1,4  0,9 
Source: Gregory and Stuart 2004 


























































Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009 
 
As it can be seen (Table 1), annual GDP growth rates were above 3 per cent in nearly 
all countries and the unweighted average growth rate was above 4 per cent until mid-
Seventies. Since then growth rates have dramatically decelerated. Many explanations 
have been given of this fact that cannot be discussed here. The critical question would 
be  to  explain  whether  the  deceleration  was  due  to  contingent  or  extra-economic 
circumstances  or  instead  they  have  been  caused  by  structural  factors  of  an 
irremediably doomed economic system. 
To solve this dilemma we consider that transformation was moved by the desire of 
governments and the population to return to the high growth rates of the first three 
post-war decades, a growth rate that would allow to converge to Western European 
countries. It is safe to suppose that this growth rate would be at least 3 per cent. This 
rate seems quite prudential if one considers the favourable environmental factors that 
transformation opened up (inflow of financial resources, openness to foreign trade, 
Western  support,  technical  progress),  factors  that  would  have  probably  revived 
somewhat growth even in the old system. 
With 3 per cent yearly growth rate of GDP income roughly doubles every 24 years. 
After  the  20  years  elapsed  since  1989,  the  level  of  income  should  have  reached 
approximately 175, putting 1989=100. Few countries have reached this level by 2008. 
Their number still decreases if we exclude successful performance due primarily to 
exogenous factors, such as booming oil prices (that had nearly irrelevant effects within 
Comecon) or massive Western support. 
The  six  countries  for  which  there  are  continuous  comparable  data  on  yearly  GDP 
growth (IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009) have reached the value of 
149 (unweighted average) by the end of 2008. Of these, Poland reached 186, but 
Bulgaria  was  at  a  bare  94,  below  the  starting  point.  These  countries  are  Albania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania. This group includes some of the best 
performer countries, and even they are clearly below the theoretical level they could 
have reached. We should not forget, in fact, that in the best performer, Poland, 1989 
performance was at an absolute low level due to a decade of political and economic 
turmoil and therefore had a greater reserve of “unexpressed” natural growth already in 
1989. Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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For  another  group  of  countries  (including  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  FYR 
Macedonia,  Kazakhstan,  Moldova,  Russia,  Ukraine,  Uzbekistan,  Kyrgyz  Republic, 
Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan)  we  have  complete  comparable  series  since  1991.  In  this 
period these countries reached as an average a value of 168, roughly in line with what 
one could expect. However, this group includes quite distinct performances, spanning 
from remarkable performance in Central Asia by Turkmenistan (260) and Uzbekistan 
(192) and the Caucasus by Armenia and Azerbaijan (290 and 242 respectively) and the 
very  difficult  situation  of  Moldova  and  Ukraina  (94  and  93  respectively).  The  most 
important country in this group, Russia reached barely an index of 129. 
Finally, there is another group of countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Estonia,  Georgia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania,  whose  performance  has  been  generally 
remarkable  and  clearly  superior  to  the  pre-transformation  performance.  However, 
information  for  these  countries  starts  between  1992  and  1996,  at  the  trough  of 
transitional  depression.  BiH  and  Georgia  also  enjoyed  a  period  of  post-war 
reconstruction strongly supported by foreign countries and international organisations. 
Foreign support was important also in other countries, from the Baltics to the Balkans. 
Various other factors influenced performance along with the change of the economic 
system: booming world demand (positive), change in population (generally shrinking 
due to migration and decreasing life expectancy in various countries, hence a negative 
factor), remittances from migrant citizens (positive), inflow of resources from abroad 
and the international organisations (positive) and illegal export of capital and resources 
(negative), post-war reconstruction (positive), natural resources endowment and their 
access  to  the  world  market  (positive),  international  smuggling,  laundering,  and 
trafficking (positive). The overall verdict is still pending and the inability to guarantee 
all  other  conditions  being  equal  prevents  the  possibility  to  reach  a  clearcut  overall 
picture. It is anyway a fact that some countries – including members of the European 
Union – are still below the absolute income level in 1989 (or 1991 in the case of post-
Soviet countries). Only for few countries convincing evidence exists that in the twenty 
or so years of transformation economic growth accelerated. However, a more detailed 
analysis is still pending for attributing the outcome to the different factors at work. 
The above data show that, along with some spectacular successes (whose solidity and 
sustainability are presently at the test of the international crisis), for various countries 
transformation  has  been  so  far  overall  a  doubtful  undertaking  –  although  it  was 
certainly a great opportunity for particular individuals and social groups even in the 
worst cases. The verdict is, anyway, radically different for diverse countries, so that an 
aggregate explanation would be in an uneasy situation. 
Is there a parallel between high growth and transformation policies that had success in 
managing simultaneously analysis and interpretation and that were respectful of both 
general  principles  and  local  circumstances?  An  exhaustive  answer  to  this  question 
would require a systematic and deep discussion of  the starting conditions and the 
post-1989 developments. As a hint, limited to some of the new EU member countries, 
one can observe that the countries that went through far reaching round tables and 
spent much social time in discussing critical issues such as privatisation strategy, such 
as Poland, or that relied on a variety of solutions (e.g. in the ownership of firms) so to 
avoid the polarisation of societies and favour social dialogue, such as Slovenia and to a 
more limited extent Hungary (all countries have relatively low income differences – see 
Table 2) were better off in the first decade of transformation than countries, such as 
Bulgaria,  the  Baltic  states  or  even  the  Czech  Republic,  which  relied  initially  on Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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straightforward solutions (such as mass privatisation) which on (analytic) paper were 
superior. Particularly noteworthy has been the case of Slovenia, which is probably the 
country which went closer to the model presented in section 1. 
Table 2 – Income inequality in countries in transformation 















Eurostat  Eurostat 
Albania   5.9   4.1   28.2   (2002)   28.2 
(2002) 
   
Armenia   8   5   33.8   (2003)   41.3 
(2004) 
   
Azerbaijan   3.3   2.6   36.5   (2001)   36.5 
(2001) 
   
Belarus   6.9   4.5   29.7   (2002)   30.4 
(2000) 
   
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
5.4   3.8   26.2   (2001)   26.2 
(2001) 
   





Croatia   7.3   4.8   29   (2001)   29 
(2001) 
  29 (2003) 










Georgia   15.4   8.3   40.4   (2003)   38 
(2003) 
   





Kazakhstan   8.5   5.6   33.9   (2003)   31.5 
(2003) 
   
Kyrgyzstan   6.4   4.4   30.3   (2003)   29 
(2001) 
   










Moldova   8.2   5.3   33.2   (2003)   36.2 
(2001) 
   
Mongolia   17.8   9.1   30.3   (1998)   44 
(1998) 
   










Russia   12.7   7.6   39.9   (2002)   40 
(2002) 
   
Slovakia   6.7   4   25.8   (1996)   25.8 
(1996) 
  26 (2005) 







Tajikistan   7.8   5.2   32.6   (2003)   34.7 
(1998) 
   
Turkmenistan   12.3   7.7   40.8   (1998)   40.8 
(1998) 
   
Ukraine   5.9   4.1   28.1   (2003)   29 
(1999) 
   
Uzbekistan   6.1   4   26.8   (2000)   26.8 
(2000) 
   
EU-15            30 
(2005) 
30 (2005) 
EU-25            29 
(2005) 
31 (2005) Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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Source: EarthTrends (http://earthtrends.wri.org) Searchable Database Results provided by the 
World Resources Institute (http://www.wri.org); Eurostat. 
In  spite  of  their  geographical  extension  and  unfavourable  initial    conditions  (e.g. 
regional concentration of heavy industry with high territorial disparities, particularly in 
Slovakia)  both  Poland  and  Slovakia,  let  alone  Slovenia,  have  increased  territorial 
differences less than the other countries, including Hungary (Chart 3a). The same can 
be said to a certain extent of concentration of production in capital cities (Chart 3b). 
One  can  attempt  to  state  that  the  former  were  more  successful  in  managing 
simultaneously  analytical  and  interpretive  processes  and  this  management  gave 
greater  room  to  local  circumstances,  along  with  strong(er)  respect  of  general 
principles. This fact is obviously in strict relation to pre-transformation experimentation 
and reforms. 













A further aspect that the simultaneous management of analysis and interpretation has 
guaranteed is the change in the composition of elites. Elite structure, in fact, differs 
remarkably between countries: “The more limited the ideological and power monopoly 
of the cadre elite and the more balanced it is by counter-elites [i.e. the more important 
is social interpretation on the eve of transformation], the greater the chances of a 
regime and peaceful constitutional-political transformation.” (Lane et al. 2007, pp. 13-
14) 
It is easy to see how this aspect is linked to the burden and length of transitional 
depression. In fact, where there was a profound and far reaching regime change, also 
before transformation formally started, and privatisation was relatively orderly with less 
opportunities for illicit or illegal asset appropriation, the degree to which elites also 
changed was high. Also the quality of the elites mattered: pre-transformation reforms 
in Central Europe had a far reaching effect on the capabilities of both economic and 
political  elites,  in  particular  by  opening  the  way  to  managerial  positions  to  better 
educated  and  skilled  people,  less  linked  to  the  party  structure  (Rus  2007,  Lengyel 
2007). In such countries as Poland and Hungary “…there was a far smaller chance for 
the respective members of the cadre elite to remain in party or state position… [while] 
the winners of the Russian nomenclature of 1988 had a greater chance to be still in 
party and state positions in 1993, and a smaller number switched to managerial or 
professional positions.” (Lane et al. 2007, p. 14) In Poland and Hungary two-thirds of 
the  former  cadre  elite  shifted  mainly  towards  business,  managerial  or  professional 
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a substantial change of managerial personnel, particularly during the Eighties, whereby 
younger,  better  educated,  technically  skilled  and  less  politicised  managers  replaced 
older and more politically faithful managers. 
Being  the  new  economic  elites  more  technical  and  less  political  in  their  origin  and 
formation thanks to pre-transformation reforms, Central European countries had better 
managed enterprises, transitional depression was milder and shorter, and economic 
growth  started  sooner  (even  without  relying  on  rich  endowments  with  natural 
resources). Having the elite circulation been greater, it was easier to find a common 
language  between  the  new  economic  and  political  elites.  Clearly  this  situation  was 
more favourable not only for professional problem-solving, but also for interpretation, 
since  it  caused  less  social  tensions  and  less  strains  within  enterprises.  Systemic 
openness to competence at enterprise level also means that local features were better 
evaluated  and  considered.  However,  this  development  was  accompanied  by  lower 
regard for general principles of sound management, including softer budget constraint 
for both the state and enterprises (Kornai 1986). 
One could ask whether the real difference among different cases lies in the time that 
was left to actors and processes to change and adapt. The debate on shock therapy 
versus gradualism highlighted some important aspects of the issue, yet it missed the 
essence of the problems at stake. In fact, shock therapy – as any other kind of stress 
situation (Dallago 2007) - is likely to push actors to which the therapy is addressed to 
adopt  conservative  behaviour  and  answers  and  prevent  experimentation,  while 
gradualism can also give time to block change and to entrench positions. 
What  really  matters  is  the  quality  of  processes  (respect  of  general  principles  and 
consideration  of  local  features)  and  finding  a  common,  socially  shared  view  of  the 
changes,  based  on  a  good  analysis  of  the  problems  at  stake  and  the  technical 
processes that can be used to solve those problems and the consequences deriving 
from  their  use.  It  is  only  on  this  basis  that  the  selection  between  fast  action  and 
lengthier processes becomes a technical issue devoid of strategic behaviour and an 
issue  of  implementing  the  society’s  vision  and  choices,  placing  the  accent  on 
production in place of distribution of the ownership and control over existing assets. 
This solution would also give actors the necessary incentives to acquire the knowledge 
and capabilities necessary in the new system. 
 
4.  What  prevented  the  different  dimensions  from  being  managed 
simultaneously 
Why  was  the  necessity  for  the  simultaneous  multilevel  management  of 
transformational  issues  difficult  to  recognise  ex  ante  by  most  analysts  and  policy 
makers,  both  domestically  and  internationally?  First,  one  could  maintain  that  the 
necessity for a simultaneous management of analysis and interpretation in due respect 
of both economic principles and local conditions may be true in “normal” conditions 
and not in the exceptional transformation of a market-averse system, which paid no 
attention  to  those  principles,  into  a  market  system.  Here,  one  could  maintain, 
interpretation was solved once and for all by the democratic decision of those countries 
to change the economic system in a market sense. In some countries round tables 
between social and political forces were organised ex ante to deal with the hottest 
interpretative issues. Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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The  simplifying  view  of  the  exceptional  circumstances  is  mistaken  for  two  sets  of 
reasons. On the one side, the old system managed both analysis (in the form of central 
planning) and interpretation (through socialist ideology) and took general principles 
(idiosyncratic  to  Soviet-type  socialism)  and  local  features  (national  variants  and 
reforms) in some accounts, but this happened in a limited, incomplete and often non 
sustainable way. However, this approach to the four issues was embedded in social 
relations, economic standards and psychological attitudes that were some of the basic 
legacies of the old system and survived through time. 
On  the  other  side,  the transformation  strategy that  prevailed  put  economies  under 
stress,  which  often  caused  conservative  adaptation  to  the  new  four  issues,  thus 
slowing down or diverting their entry into effect. For the success of transformation is 
was necessary to get rid of the old approach and the prevailing transition strategy 
implicitly considered, wrongly, that this could be done with a clearcut and hard vision 
of the four issues, in the sense that only general principles and the deriving analysis 
matter. The exceptionality thesis, thus, contradicts itself, along with being out of tune 
with the rapidly evolving situation. 
Indeed, while central planning was analytic, most interpretation was left to ideology 
and, to a limited extent, to the central political level (Grossman 1983, Kornai 1992). 
Public spaces for interpretation were rare and, except in a limited number of cases 
(particularly Hungary and Poland), under the influence of ideology and politics. Firms 
were executors of central orders, with the partial exception of reformed economies. 
However, even in the latter case analysis and interpretation had often as a goal more 
to  manage  shortage  (and  get  private  advantages),  then  to  innovate  for  improving 
performance and wellbeing. These features could not disappear overnight, missing an 
interpretive dimension to give the necessary reference to economic actors. The starting 
point was, therefore, unfavourable, while the size and range of the aims and goals 
were enormously demanding and evolving. 
Second, the Washington Consensus – which constituted the core of the transformation 
strategy at least in the first years - had a vision of the four issues that was incomplete 
and at odds with the situation of those countries. In fact, the Washington Consensus is 
intrinsically analytic and based on general principles, implying a set of effective and 
enforced market institutions and well working markets. Consequently it can suppose 
that the path of transformation is known (i.e. it is a process of transition) and that local 
circumstances  and  discovery  are  irrelevant,  except  perhaps  in  quantitative  terms. 
Interpretation  was  missing,  and  the  essence  of  the  Washington  Consensus  and  its 
basic  components  (macroeconomic  stabilisation,  liberalisation  and  privatisation)  was 
one of ready-made recipe fitting all situations. Also the implementation of this strategy 
left little space to interpretation and limited the possibility of experimentation. 
Liberalisation pushed firms to adapt rapidly and so it supported analysis. Moreover, the 
role of competition may be disruptive of interpretation. For economic actors who were 
at best used to compete on the input side even mild competition may be disruptive of 
interpretation.  Foreign  competition,  while  providing  a  ground  for  imitation,  is 
particularly damaging for interpretation adapted to local circumstances in a period of 
transformation, since imitation may easily have foreign circumstances as a reference. 
As to privatisation, large firms received generally harsh priority. This focused attention 
at country level on analytical problems, such as establishing the value of the firm and 
finding new owners, and away from interpretation, such as considering whether and in 
which  circumstances  it  was  preferable  to  proceed  with  the  privatisation  of  large Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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enterprises  or  give  priority  and  related  resources  to  the  establishment  of  new 
enterprises.
11  Not  much  energy  and  time  remained  to  the  new  owners  for 
understanding  what  actually  matters  in  an  economy,  finding  a  common  language 
(internalising the new institutions) and experimenting solutions, such as finding market 
opportunities,  pursuing  technical  progress,  deciding  the  products  range,  achieving 
strategic alliances. The outcome were booming numbers of enterprises, most of them 
vary small, uncompetitive and striving for survival (Scase 2003). Since the latter fate 
also  regarded  many  companies  in  domestic  ownership,  the  economy  became  often 
segmented between a competitive, open sector and an uncompetitive domestic sector 
which do not communicate or make much mutual business. Interpretation then was 
missing at both national and firm level. 
Third, processes were accelerated at the price of their completeness for fear of foot 
dragging and conservative resistance. It was considered that time mattered a lot, that 
time should not be lost for interpretation, and results had to be reached rapidly. This 
was  necessary  to  make  transformation  irreversible  and  compensate  people  for  the 
pains suffered due to the old system and the little transitional depression that was 
considered  inevitable.  This  led  some  newly  elected  governments  to  accelerate 
transformation in order to use the “window of opportunity” and consequently get rid of 
interpretation and adaptation to local circumstances as devices for slowing down and 
jeopardising the feasibility and success transition.
12 More than for technical reasons, 
this  third  point  was  based  on  the  perceived  weakness  of  new  governments  and 
reformers  compared  to  supposedly  strong,  although  covered  conservatives  and 
reactionaries and pressure groups. It is not by chance that one of the supporters of 
this  view,  Anatoly  Chubais,  the  leading  figure  in  Russian  privatisation,  spoke  of  a 
Bolshevik approach to identify this position.
13 
Fourth, the necessity for the simultaneous multilevel management of transformational 
issues remained unrecognised also because of the distributive opportunities that a bi-
dimensional  transformation  created.  Old  managers  and  politicians  and  others  were 
interested,  on  the  eve  of  transformation  and  during  its  first  period,  in  positioning 
                                                 
11 Not all observers would agree with the necessity to give serious priority to the development of strong 
and competitive new enterprises. Perhaps the best known supporter of this view is Kornai (1990), but 
many others have shared this view (e.g. McIntyre and Dallago 2003, OECD 2008). As Kornai (2001) put 
it: “The transition from socialism to capitalism has to be an organic development. It cannot be done 
otherwise. It is a curious amalgam of revolution and evolution. It is a trial-and-error process, which 
retains or liquidates old institutions, and tries out, accepts or rejects new ones. Each element in the 
process might be very rapid, fairly rapid or slow. Each has its own appropriate speed. Some episodes 
call  for  a  one-stroke  intervention.  Many  other  processes  advance  by  incremental  changes.”  A  more 
limited number of analysts maintain that the number of SMEs should be drastically reduced by means of 
mergers and acquisitions (e.g. Mihályi 2008). The two views are not necessarily incompatible, although 
the latter overlooks the particular weakness of SMEs in transformation countries. OECD 2008 pays a 
particular attention to this issue.  
12 Yegor Gaidar, who was minister of stabilisation and privatisation in 1992, stressed that “…the gradualist 
approach to transforming a communist economy is the strategy of a communist or totalitarian regime 
trying  to  adapt  to  new  realities.  …  But  shock  treatment  is  usually  the  only  alternative  for  a  post-
communist government coming to power after the strategy of the previous regime (or bad luck) has led 
to the failure of the gradualist approach.” Gaidar and Pöhl (1995), p. 4 
13  Anatoly  Chubais  is  credited  to  have  answered  in  the  following  way  to  a  question  on  his  role  as 
privatisation minister between 1992 and 1994: “…Chubais conceded that his privatization efforts could 
be characterized as Bolshevik style – lacking public support and quickly executed. … His strategy was to 
privatize as quickly as possible, using every minute of the day to privatize: ‘I did not speak, I privatized’, 
Chubais  proclaimed.”  From  the  report  issued  by  the  Carnegie  Endowment,  Washington,  D.C.  where 
Chubais gave a lecture on May 17, 1999 (quoted in Kornai, 2001). Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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themselves in a favourable way, having in mind both the possibility to capture assets 
and  finding  valuable  positions  in  the  new  system.  In  such  a  way  they  themselves 
disregarded the interpretive dimension. People endowed with superior local knowledge 
and information could take advantage of the strategy and policies disregard of this 
dimension. These individuals and groups typically had influence on the strategy and 
the choice and implementation of policies.
14 
Even  if  the  simultaneous  management  of  the  four  dimensions  failed  during 
transformation,  one  could  maintain  that  transformation  was  important  in  the 
perspective of Sen’s paradigm of development as freedom. If so, the completeness of 
transformation could be built ex post thanks to freedom. Indeed, transformation had 
this overarching goal as a priority: removing dictatorship or paternalism, opening social 
and  economic  opportunities,  promote  freedom  of  choice  in  economic,  political  and 
social fields alike. However, as it turned out, too many of these freedoms were lost of 
sight and abandoned or postponed along the road. As Rus (2007) correctly stresses, 
what resulted was a transformation process clearly based on agency theory framework 
even in the case of enterprises, whereby the emphasis on the allocation of property 
rights to principals neglected the problem of agents. The freedoms of some privileged 
people  (those  who  had  access  to  assets)  were  successfully  implemented  at  the 
expenses  of  the  rest  of  society  and  in  particular  those  who  had  to  manage  those 
assets. This led to suboptimal management an sometimes mismanagement of those 
assets, since social and the agents’ control was weak and competitive pressure over 
their efficient use was also inadequate in the domestic sector. 
Transformation that came out of the bi-dimensional approach disregarded important 
dimensions of the overall problem and gave a sometimes unfavourable role to those 
components – analysis and general principles – that were privileged. In the debate and 
policy making during and on transformation, local conditions and their distance from 
sound general principles were considered under the heading of “starting conditions”. 
However,  the  analytical  dimension  dominated  even  here  in  that  starting  conditions 
were limited to the macroeconomic situation, with nearly complete disregard for the 
institutional and microeconomic settings. Even when institutions were considered (in 
particular  in  privatisation),  it  was  only  formal  institutions  that  were  the  subject  of 
policies,  with  disregard  for  informal  institutions,  their  interrelation  with  formal 
institutions and their reaction to transformation policies and processes. There was a 
further  dimension  missing:  by  starting  conditions  was  typically  meant  national 
conditions,  with  disregard  for  sub-national  issues  (including  fostering  and  nurturing 
entrepreneurship),  while  even  microeconomic  institutions  reform  followed  at  a 
distance.
15  For  different  reasons  that  will  be  clarified  below,  this dimension  was  of 
critical importance. 
On the other side, analysis was limited to the technical solutions necessary to solve 
particular problems: how much of stabilisation, how fast reforms should be, what to 
privatise  and  how,  how  to  liberalise  and  what.  The  interrelation  among  different 
problems and aspects was largely disregarded: e.g. what to do with companies that 
                                                 
14  The  same  Gaidar  acknowledged  in  fact  that:  “In  adopting  a  universal  approach  [to  privatisation], 
however, we somehow had to take into account the interests of the various social groups that had the 
power to block the implementation of the privatization procedures: for instance, the managers of the 
State enterprises, the working collectives, and the regional centres of power.” Gaidar and Pöhl (1995), 
p. 41. 
15  This  fact  is  rather  clearly  evidenced  in  the  EBRD  transition  indicators  by  the  delay  with  which 
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could  not  be  privatised,  what  happens  when  prices  are  liberalised  in  a  context 
dominated by large monopolistic firms, how would enterprises used to have a soft 
budget constraint react to restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, what would have 
happened to supplier networks following the privatisation of large companies. The term 
traditionally used of “transition” was indeed meant to identify this aspect of problem 
solving. However, problem-solving requires that the basic coordinates of the issue (the 
set of problems at stake, their features and interrelation) are known and the goals are 
defined. This requires that institutions are well defined and effective. This approach 
overlooked that the undertaking was totally novel (the famous transformation of a fish 
soup into an aquarium), the actors involved were inexperienced in this undertaking, 
basic  coordinates  (institutions)  were  missing.  Under  these  circumstances 
experimentation had to play a central role and wide-ranging and deep interpretation 
was required.
16 
Inexperienced  actors  in  a  ill-defined  context  could  hardly  solve  the  problem.  The 
classical  solutions  are  making  the  actors’  boundaries  permeable  in  order  to  foster 
cooperation and relying on public spaces (Lester and Piore 2004). The former was 
hardly a possibility during the first period of transformation, when interpretation was 
most needed. In fact, boundaries were economically ill-defined in the old system, when 
they  were  primarily  of  administrative  nature,  and  any  permeability  during 
transformation could be exploited to grab assets. Privatisation and restructuring made 
the boundaries change rapidly and radically. Therefore, interpretation had to rely on 
open spaces. The most important open spaces could be organisations that did not 
suffer excessive transformational stress, since the latter diverted their energies and 
focus.  This  were  not  enterprises  o  their  associations,  but  political  parties,  social 
organisations, round tables and reform committees, governments (in particular after 
systemic change), universities and research institutes, and international organisations. 
Unfortunately,  the  social  and  political  context  was  not  conducive  to  genuine 
interpretation  for  both  the  excessive  novelty  of  the  event,  the  ill-defined  issues  at 
stake, and above all the political and social pressure to go ahead with problem solving 
and implementing solutions and the distributive opportunities  that systemic change 
offered to smart and quick people. Convinced that it was a few critically important 
formal changes that were ultimately responsible for the improvement of performance 
that  was  expected  from  transformation,  domestic  policymakers  and  international 
agencies tried to get rid of public spaces or sought to reproduce in public spaces the 
kinds  of  mainstream  and  competitive  mechanisms  that  market  forces  impose  upon 
private business. This approach reduced the space for original elaboration of solutions 
in line with local circumstances. Being this the dominant game, many individuals and 
groups owning valuable assets (such as occupying a crucial position, having important 
interpersonal relations, bargaining power or technical knowledge of particular value in 
the  new  context)  could  use  public  spaces  to  strategic  ends,  namely  to  capture 
opportunities to one’s or the group’s advantage. 
The disregard for institutional reform jeopardised the potential outcome that under 
these circumstances the state could and should act as a public space (Dallago 2009a). 
The  biggest  failure  was  anyway  by  international  economic  organisations.  These 
organisations were under pressure to reach success and relied largely on analytical, 
problem-solving approach and first-best policies that privileged general principles with 
little regard for local conditions – except perhaps in quantitative macroeconomic terms. 
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In the longer run, transformation countries were left to the only approach that works 
under these conditions: trials and errors. After a first period of experimentation with 
first-best policies, a period which lasted just a couple of months in some cases or for 
years,
17  and  under  political  and  social  pressure  and  the  economic  evidence  of 
transitional  depression  much  longer  and  deeper  than  envisaged,  governments  and 
other parties resumed interpretation and paid greater attention to local circumstances. 
However,  the  first  period  of  one-sided  transformation  and  policies  had  important 
consequences  for  both  the  costs  of  transformation  and  their  interpersonal  and 
intertemporal allocation. Also the outcome of transformation was different – sometimes 
quite  so  –  from  what  was  envisaged,  with  many  unforeseen  and  unwanted 
consequences, bad and positive surprises (Uvalic and Vaughan-Whitehead 1997). The 
dominant approach had consequences that are bound to remain in time and that often 
are  a  real  burden  over  economic  performance  and  stability.  The  wave  of  populist 
policies that followed in later years in various countries owes probably much to this 
first approach. 
The partial exception was the European Union. This was due to both its nature of a 
club of member countries with equal rights and duties and the strong role that a more 
complex economic approach – the social market economy – still has in the EU. Thanks 
to these features, the EU had to adopt a more differentiated approach that nearly 
bureaucratised  transformation  and  acted  as  a  long-term  external  anchor.  This  was 
done primarily through the 31 chapters that perspective members have to comply with. 
However, this kind of friendly yet quasi-rigorous bureaucratisation provided countries 
with a clear perspective for problem solving, a limited space for interpretation at the 
margin and a more serious consideration of local conditions through different funds – 
at least for enjoying asymmetric benefits. The EU was thus the only actor that acted 
partially as an open space for interpretation and with concern for local conditions. This 
was due to the fact that, although the EU foresees a clear goal (conforming to the 
acquis communautaire) and set of steps (the 31 chapters), it also requires and allows 
for progressive adjustment (discussion, bargaining, asymmetries) that in their complex 
are interpretative in nature. 
To  summarise,  barely  any  genuine  interpretation  took  place  during  much  part  of 
transformation, while analysis was applied to bring the economies in line with general 
problems.  Local  circumstances  were  largely  ignored,  except  for  the  quantitative 
macroeconomic  variables.  Simultaneous  management  of  the  four  dimensions  was 
disregarded.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  sustainable  systemic  innovation  and  strong 
economic performance could come out of this approach. 
 
5.  Transformation  and  local  development:  managing  analysis  and 
interpretation simultaneously 
The process of economic transformation had as a primary step the decentralisation, in 
a market sense, of previously centrally planned economies together with the need to 
foster  and  activate  innovation  and  competitiveness.  The  Soviet-type  system  was 
primarily analytical and based on general (“socialist”) principles with little interpretation 
and adaptation to local circumstances. Interpretation was prevented by ideology (and 
the  Soviet  Union  control)  and  was  mostly  limited  to  the  highest  echelons  of  the 
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Communist  Party.  Some  adaptation  to  local  circumstances  in  the  economic  domain 
took place through economic reforms since the Sixties. 
Particular forms of adaptation to local circumstances – and the result of a mixture of 
problem solving (how to improve performance and go from “extensive” to “intensive” 
growth  within  the  limits  of  the  existing  economic  system  and  political  regime)  and 
interpretation – included Khruschev’s introduction of sovnarchozy or Regional Economic 
Councils  in  1957,  that  is  the  failed  territorialisation  of  economic  management;  the 
generalisation of personal and family plots in agriculture; self-management outside of 
Yugoslavia,  where  it  was  the  outcome  of  a  political  decision  to  contrast  Soviet 
influence; the introduction of semi-private production organisations (such as various 
labour  organisations  in  Hungary  in  1982);  tolerance  of  “residuals”  of  past  systems 
(small  scale  private  activity)  and  of  the  underground  economy.  While  sovnarchozy 
where short lived in Soviet time, other forms of adaptation and limited experimentation 
were the victims of harsh transition and privatisation. 
One  reason  for  the  destruction  of  the  little  interpretation  and  adaptation  to  local 
circumstances was that these functions were concentrated in the destroyed structures 
of the Party and central planning. Harsh transition – and certainly also the economic 
and  political  weakness  of  countries  in  transformation  -prevented  the  possibility  for 
many years to foster those functions in a market perspective. When they started to 
develop, they were both under the aegis of the need to comply with superior analytical 
issues (create favourable conditions for foreign capital, decrease deficits and debts, 
comply with the requirements of international organisations) in full respect of general 
principles. Interpretation and adaptation to local circumstances remained ancillary. 
Local  development  includes  all  those  conditions  that  foster  performance  and 
transformation of the economy and society located on a given subnational territory. It 
includes,  therefore,  both  enterprise  foundation,  growth  and  restructuring;  the 
production,  use,  and  management  of  human,  social  and  physical  resources  (the 
territory); structural change; and the activity of governments (both local and national). 
Since  any  economic  activity  is  localised  on  the  territory  and  such  localisation  is 
determined  by  the  favourable  features  of  a  particular  location,  diffused  local 
development  is  critical  to  any  economy  and  is  the  basis  of  general  economic 
development.  Therefore  success  with  local  development  means  creating  favourable 
conditions for development tout court. 
To be successful, local development requires both analytical problem solving (e.g. how 
to decrease costs, which investment should be implemented, where getting financial 
resources, where building roads and infrastructure, establishing performance friendly 
taxation) and interpretation (which kind of development and growth strategies are the 
most apt to a given territory or individual agents; which form of enterprise or kind of 
relation with partners and competitors should be the most effective; when and how to 
innovate). It also requires respect for general principles (wages linked to productivity, 
sound budgets, investing only if there are reasonable expectations to recover costs) 
and for local circumstances (choose carefully the location of the investment, labour 
relations  in  line  with  local  traditions,  cooperation  between  firms  and  local 
governments). 
In transformation economies, local development is particularly important for another 
reason.  Small  and  medium  size  enterprises  (SMEs)  and  local  governments  are 
particularly apt to foster interpretation and adaptation to local circumstances. This is so 
for their very nature linked to the territory, thus feeling less directly the strong external Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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pressure  to  analyse  and  follow  general  principles;  and  because  they  are  closer  to 
processes and know better local features, capabilities, opportunities, and constraints. 
Local  development  is  thus  particularly  important  in  managing  these  variables 
simultaneously with problem solving and general principles under the influence of the 
central  government,  provided  that  the  state  machine  is  effective  and  efficient  in  a 
market friendly sense. 
This important aspect was largely disregarded during transformation and the little local 
development that took place was left to the initiative of local governments and social 
and political movements and spontaneous processes of enterprise foundation, growth, 
and restructuring. However, the missing reform of the state is at the basis of the lack 
of coordination among these processes and the possible threat they pose to successful 
transformation and national performance (the epitome case being Yeltzin’s Russia). 
During transformation territorial differences increased substantially as much as other 
forms of inequality. This was due to unleashed “spontaneous” processes that went 
from agglomeration of economic activities and (foreign) capital to the obstacles that 
regional governments put to transferring fiscal revenues to the central government. 
Development programmes (e.g. to attract foreign investments), when sound, where 
generally analytic/problem-solving in nature and limited to the given locality without 
discourse and interpretation involving neighbouring localities and central governments 
and  sometimes  disregarding  sound  general  principles  (e.g.  the  opportunity  cost  of 
granting subsidies to foreign investors). This led to lack of coordination of economic 
activity  and  policy  making  that  in  the  medium  run  disadvantaged  also  successful 
localities. Governments tried to encourage coordination among localities, particularly so 
in view of EU membership, with uncertain effective success. 
Lack of interpretation and experimentation at local level made difficult also to define 
national strategies, led to uncoordinated actions and waste of resources and, in the 
long  run,  waste  of  opportunities  that  also  depressed  the  inflow  of  foreign  capital. 
Indeed foreign capital inflow remained largely linked to privatisation, with much less 
capital going to greenfield investment. Since much technical innovation is locally based, 
this led to innovation failure. A proof of this is that SMEs are generally ailing while the 
analytical devices that were implemented (such as industrial parks, financial support, 
business incubators) remained largely on paper and were ineffective (on Hungary see 
Dallago 2009b). 
During transformation, socially productive innovation should take place at two levels: 
at systemic and technical level. At systemic level, institutional innovation often failed to 
manage successfully the coordination of formal and informal institutions. In fact, it 
relied  nearly  exclusively  on  problem  solving  approaches  both  at  national  and  local 
levels  that  privileged  formal  institutions  and  disregarded  informal  ones.  Even  at 
individual level actors failed to master interpretation and privileged a short-run, formal 
and  narrow  approach.  What  has  been  missing  is  the  interpretative  and  integrating 
component  necessary  to  create  language,  perception  and  view  common  to  all  the 
actors  involved  and  pursue  a  shared  development  path.  The  lack  of  interpretation 
made  also  impossible  to  adapt  general  principles  and  best  practices  to  local 
circumstances. This fostered and increased conflicts between the centre and localities 
and  among  the  latter,  thus  increasing  the  costs  of  transformation  and  policy 
implementation. 
At  technical  level,  these  countries  needed  to  radically  change  technology  and 
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organisation  of  production  along  administrative  considerations  (central  planning, 
administrative and political control). Once again, the lack of interpretation put these 
countries in a critical position, although some important results were reached.
18 The 
analytical approach led to adopt the best practices and solutions that were often alien 
to the existing technical culture, capabilities, and social organisation and relations. It 
also failed to pursue adaptation of technology to local circumstances. Technological 
change succeeded in foreign affiliates, but also there it was often managed by foreign 
experts  (transplantation)  and  lacked  local  research  basis  (that  was  typically  closed 
down). Organisationally, foreign affiliates themselves remained close to enclaves and 
also  “imported”  their  suppliers,  while  most  domestic  companies  interacted  among 
themselves. This generated territorial, organisational, and technical segmentation of 
the economy. 
One important advantage of local development is that it can attenuate foot dragging in 
transformation, since it lives from and builds up social capital, thus social control and 
pressure. This is important particularly for the transformation of informal institutions. 
Formal institutions can be changed through substantial initial investment of human, 
financial and organisational resources (perhaps financed internationally) to support the 
take-off of new institutions. Informal institutions, however, are insensitive to this kind 
of  investment  since  they  are  sticky,  and  change  incrementally  at  the  margin. 
Disregarding  them  was  due  to  the  attempt  to  allocate  the  cost  of  the  necessary 
marginal investment to individual actors – or to the confidence that formal institutions 
would change “automatically”, which is the same. 
One important reason for fostering local development during transformation lies in the 
equity and capabilities fostering nature of local development and the effect that this 
has on stability and diffused entrepreneurship. One of the most striking consequences 
of  transformation  was  the  rapid  increase  of  inequalities  and  other  forms  of 
polarisations of economies and societies (Lane et al. 2007). There is a polarised social 
and economic stratification, including the rise of a wealthy class and the pauperisation 
of large strata of the population in most countries. Official statistics and international 
data show an important increase of distributive disparities since transformation started. 
However,  both  the  quality  of  statistics  in  various  countries  and  the  spread  of  the 
underground economy, that apparently tends to hide particularly the highest incomes, 
suggest that official data may underestimate the real disparities existing, particularly in 
non-EU member countries. 
Much of this stratification has its counterpart in territorial stratification, in the sense 
that the localisation of valuable resources and growth are concentrated in capital cities 
(in spite of shrinking populations they concentrate an increasing share of the countries’ 
production, income and wealth) and a few relatively wealthy territories (Chart 3a and 
Chart 3b). Other territories are losing resources and opportunities and ailing. They also 
concentrate a disproportionate share of the poor and the unemployed (see Eurostat 
2009). With the disruption of some countries, in particular former Yugoslavia, territorial 
disparities may now largely coincide with national borders (see table 3). 
This polarisation brings with itself a growing division of interests between different 
strata of society, and consequently greater difficulty of interpretation and of pursuing 
simultaneously general principles and appreciation for local circumstances (Chart 1a 
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and Chart 1b). Economic, social and territorial polarisation create clashing perceptions, 
interests and strategies. Congestion on one side and lack of opportunities on the other 
follow, since losing social groups and regions see their opportunities and capabilities 
decrease  (Sen  1999),  while  winners  may  easily  waste  resources,  at  least  because 
(particularly  so  in  small  transformation  countries)  they  tend  to  export  capital  and 
import luxury goods. 
Table 3 – Some indicators of malaise in South-Eastern Europe 






Albania  12,5  26,7 (2005)  25 
BiH  29  56,2  20 
Bulgaria  6,3  30,7  14,1 
Croatia  14,8  29 (2008)  11 (2003) 
Kosovo  40  30 (2006)  37 
Macedonia  35 (2008)  39 (2003)  22 
Montenegro  14,7  30  7 
Romania  3,6 (2008)  32  25 (2005) 
Serbia  18,8  30  6,5 
Source: World Bank, CIA (The World Factbook), EBRD 
Local development has by its very nature diffused character. This supports finding a 
common language by which to identify innovative solutions which are fundamental in 
the transformation process. There is an interesting positive relation between the role of 
interpretation, local development and economic and social stratification. Interpretation 
requires  a  commonality  of  interests  and  the  predisposition  to  work  out  jointly  a 
common language. This is possible only if the different stakeholders both within and 
outside economic organisations share a common view of processes and have common 
basic interests. The polarisation of distribution of income and wealth, capabilities and 
opportunities  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  polarisation  of  economic  and  social 
stratification.  This  prevents  finding  a  common  language,  hence  interpretation  and 
finally  innovation.  Much  of  the  effort  by  elites  will  be  addressed  to  defend  their 
privileges, while that of the destitute will be addressed to survive and perhaps change 
inequalities to their advantage. This is the old issue of the critical importance of a wide 
and prosperous middle class and social mobility, which go hand in hand with local 
development. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Along  with  the  pressure  from  outside,  the  effect  of  globalisation  and  international 
agencies,  and  domestic  illusions,  there  are  structural  factors  in  the  mainstream 
transition  strategy  that  explain  insufficient  interpretation  and  adaptation  to  local 
circumstances. The initial disruption of the state (in place of reforming it), the lack of a 
clear  and  coordinated  relation  between  different  level  governments,  and  the 
postponement  of  the  institutional  reform  (or  the  confidence  in  the  spontaneous 
implementation through the market) led to a blurred situation ridden with uncertainty Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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(including on property rights, their enforcement, and appropriabiity of returns) that 
further  shortened  the  time  horizon  of  economic  actors  and  supported  rent-seeking 
strategies.  Rapid  growing  territorial  and  social  polarisation  generated  clashing 
perceptions, interests and strategies, which resulted in clear and probably permanent 
forms of territorial, organisational, and technological segmentation. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisation, and liberalisation – the key components of 
the  dominant  transition  strategy  -  had  territorially  distinct  effects  that  advantaged 
some localities, while loser localities tried to resist by slowing down transitional policies. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation, which implied decreasing state subsidies to enterprises 
and wages and decreasing state investments, was particularly disadvantageous for the 
localities that gained most in the past with socialist industrialisation. These were the 
territories  where  large  investment  in  heavy  industry  were  concentrated. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation (and the new environmental policies) led to the destitution 
of these localities and consequently to unemployment and depression. 
Privatisation led further to reallocation of capital away from large firms, children of 
socialist  industrialisation,  closure  of  plants  by  the  new  owners  and  transfer  of 
production processes abroad, but also to massive inflow of foreign capital mainly to 
acquire existing facilities. These foreign investments went typically to a limited number 
of areas with favourable conditions, also in the case of greenfield investment. This 
created opportunities for additional activities (e.g. enterprise foundation or expansion) 
in the latter areas, but to worsening conditions in the areas of disinvestment. 
Liberalisation  had  similar  consequences.  Liberalisation  of  enterprise  foundation  and 
investment  advantaged  territories  that  were  favourably  located  (could  exploit 
economies  of  agglomeration,  had  good  infrastructure,  enjoyed  proximity  to  large 
markets), and social groups that had the relevant assets (capital, connections, skills, 
sometimes reputation). Liberalisation of exports again advantaged the territories and 
social groups which had advantages in terms of international relations (sometimes pre-
transformation contacts and cooperation, those that attracted most foreign investment, 
proximity to foreign markets, sometimes minority populations with large neighbouring 
mother  countries,  typically  Germans).  Import  liberalisation,  in  turn,  disadvantaged 
particularly  economically  weaker  territories  and  social  groups,  where  uncompetitive 
enterprises and lower skills were based. Finally, price liberalisation had similar effects. 
Territories and social groups that were advantaged by liberalisation tended to coincide, 
then, in all the three cases. 
These  events  had  particularly  unfavourable  consequences  for  part  of  local 
constituencies  and  SMEs.  Inter-regional  differences  increased  dramatically,  different 
forms of polarisation accumulated (industrial, territorial, social), while most SMEs could 
not  take  off  in  sustainability  and  competitiveness.  Even  in  countries  where  their 
numbers boomed, most of them remained uncompetitive. 
These  processes  were  based  largely  on  analytical  considerations,  but  lacked  the 
interpretation  necessary  for  a  balanced  and  long-run  development.  Not  only  social 
discourse was missing: even governments abstained from taking care of the losers. As 
noted by Rus (2007), the process was dominated by only one side of the agency, that 
of owners, with little concern for successful management, at least outside the foreign 
dominated  sector.  Territorial  and  industrial  polarisation  created  rich  and  rapidly 
growing enclaves, mostly foreign controlled, that - by attracting private capital and 
public investment and by paying unusually high incomes - have split the economy and 
the society, and consequently the polity, into segments that hardly communicate. This Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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has obvious negative consequences for the development perspective of large part of 
the economy, but also for political and social stability. 
Socially  common  understanding  based  on  interpretation  and  concern  for  local 
circumstances was later found in many countries around populist policies, that went to 
the disadvantage of domestic and external equilibrium. The 2008 international crises 
has revealed the weak sustainability of transformation strategy and the achievements 
reached so far. This event further highlights the necessity to unify the four dimensions 
of  transformation,  including  rebuilding  public  spaces  for  interpretation  and 
implementing better policies for local development. 
In putting greater weight on interpretation and local conditions there certainly is the 
danger to open the door to endless bargaining and finally to deadlock. It is not time 
now to go back to 20 years ago and start from scratch. It is necessary to build upon a 
sound analysis of achievements (such as young educated and skilled generations, EU 
membership, dynamic enterprises, improved economic structure, better infrastructure). 
Interpretation  should  deal  with  finding  a  sustainable  development  based  on  these 
achievements and on improving the place those countries occupy in the international 
division  of  labour.  Consideration  for  local  circumstances  should  never  go  against 
general  principles  and  should  consist  primarily  in  the  effort  to  promote  the 
development of disadvantaged territories and social groups and upgrading SMEs and 
their  competitiveness  without  disadvantaging  or  obstructing  the  most  dynamic 
components of the economy. 
For instance, in the case of SMEs such a complex strategy, pursuing simultaneously the 
four  dimensions,  could  build  or  rebuild  the  most  important  factors  that  support 
successful territories and enterprises. Among these, one could remind the necessity to 
foster  investment  and  technical  upgrading,  competitiveness,  growth  of  small 
businesses into medium-sized ones, fluid property structures (with weaker absolute 
control  and  attracting  external  competences)  support  the  development  of  both 
horizontal and vertical business networks, promote the aggregation of and cooperation 
among  SMEs,  and  pursue  the  progress  of  dialogue  and  programmes  for  fostering 
cooperation  with  large  businesses.  There  is  also  great  necessity  to  motivate  and 
support potential entrepreneurs and improve the skills of employees and to pursue 
policies supporting a territorially more balanced economic activity. 
A  particularly  important  goal  should  be  to  develop  public  spaces  serving  SMEs, 
including research centres, universities, and business associations. The role of these 
institutions  remained  largely  passive  as  public  spaces  that  should  deal  with 
interpretation. This may require different research and educational policy that keeps in 
greater consideration the cooperation between, e.g., universities and industry. 
All this requires a highly professional role for the state in all its dimensions and levels, 
cooperation  between  the  public  hand  and  the  private  sector,  and  a  shared 
interpretation and analysis of the economic future of the country in respect of general 
fundamental economic principles and local circumstances. Unfortunately, there is not 
much hope that this perspective will become true soon in the present divided societies 
of transformation countries. Once again, the international community, and particularly 
the EU, can play a critical role, this time hopefully in the direction of the simultaneity of 
the four dimensions. The crisis may perhaps provide a welcome opportunity to put 
transformation on a more sustainable path, as already happened in part in Russia after 
the 1998 financial crisis. Analysis, interpretation, and the Local Dimension of Economic Transformation 
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